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AB S TRAC T. This Note examines whether state or federal principles of administrative law
should govern suits challenging state agency action pursuant to cooperative federalism statutes.
Despite the prevalence of cooperative federalism statutes, courts and scholars alike have given
scant attention to this question. That neglect has translated into poorly reasoned and
inconsistent judicial decisions. We show that this question is one of federal common law that is
properly governed by the framework of Kimbell Foods, which holds that federal common law
should take state law as its substantive source unless doing so would create a significant conflict
with federal policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law scholarship focuses almost exclusively on federal
agencies implementing federal laws.' Yet state agency implementation of
federal statutes -cooperative federalism -is an integral part of our
administrative state in fields ranging from environmental law to health care to
education.3 When state agencies are sued for violating cooperative federalism
statutes they administer, courts must decide what doctrines of administrative
law should apply. Does federal or state law control? If federal, should these
agencies be treated like their federal counterparts, or must new rules be
developed to accommodate the unique issues posed by state agencies?
1. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749 (2007); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HALRv. L. REV. 2245 (2001);
Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689
(1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, ioi YALE L.J. 969
(1992); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071 (1990).
2. While cooperative federalism is sometimes used as a broad term to encompass a wide range
of ways state and federal governments may work together, for the purposes of this Note, we
use the term "cooperative federalism statutes" narrowly to describe laws that task state
agencies with carrying out regulatory or implementation responsibilities that are at least
initially laid out by a broad federal plan. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167
(1992); Carrie Gombos, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A., 28
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 542 (2004) ("There are several conceptions of cooperative
federalism, but the Supreme Court has suggested that cooperative federalism best describes
those instances in which a federal statute provides for state regulation or implementation of
plans to achieve federally prescribed policy goals . . . ."). The term "cooperative federalism"
has also been used more generally to describe a theory of government, whereby state and
federal governments often share overlapping responsibilities, as opposed to the theory of
"dual federalism," whereby state and federal actors have discrete responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 65, 65-69 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991) (describing the
theoretical distinction between these two different conceptions of government).
3. There are a number of federal statutes that enlist state agencies in carrying out the law. See
e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2006) (Medicaid); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671q
(20o6); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of47 U.S.C.). For a
description of many of the ways state agencies may be enlisted to implement federal laws,
see Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal Power, and the
Constitution, 39 Aluz. L. REV. 205 (1997).
1282
122:1280 2013
CURING THE BLIND SPOT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Surprisingly, courts and scholars alike have given scant attention to those
fundamental questions.
The recent scholarship most on point is Abbe R. Gluck's article
Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond.' Gluck exposes the gap that has
existed in current scholarship regarding the role of state agencies in statutory
interpretation. Gluck, other scholars, and the federal courts have recently
considered whether state agencies interpreting cooperative federalism statutes
that they administer should receive Chevron deference.s But Chevron deference
is only one of many doctrines that must be transposed to the context of
cooperative federalism. Courts must also determine, for example, whether state
or federal law should govern, which actions are reviewable, what standard of
review to use, and who bears the burden of proof in agency proceedings.
When facing these questions, courts operate with very little guidance from
statutory or common law. The federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
does not include state agencies within its ambit.' And federal common law
doctrines of administrative law have been developed with federal, not state,
agencies in mind. Furthermore, state administrative law doctrines that usually
apply to state agencies often diverge considerably from federal law. As we
discuss infra Section I.B, in the face of this difficult and undertheorized issue,
courts have acted reflexively, applying the law that is most familiar to them.
Federal courts apply federal law while giving little, if any, consideration to state
law. State courts, by contrast, often apply state law while giving inadequate
consideration to federal law. In part, this chaotic situation exists because courts
and commentators have not identified the issue.
By always applying one form of law, both state and federal courts treat the
issue too simply. There is great diversity in cooperative federalism regimes and
administrative law doctrines. In some cases, it will be wise to follow the
distinctive rules that states have created to govern their own institutions. In
other cases, it will be wise to ensure uniform policy across the nation. The
diversity of circumstances demands a practical approach that considers what
will happen when a given administrative law doctrine is applied to the
4. 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011).
5. See id. at 601-07; Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1999). See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 551-S59 (2006).
1283
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
statutory problem at hand. In this Note, we argue that the Supreme Court has
already developed such a framework in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.'
The question presented in Kimbell Foods was "whether contractual liens
arising from certain federal loan programs take precedence over private liens."8
The statute did not specify what the priority should be, so the Court had to use
its federal common law powers to fill the statutory gap. To do so, it could
either devise a uniform federal rule or apply state law. The Court concluded
that "a national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal interests underlying
the [federal] loan programs."' Instead, "absent a congressional directive" to the
contrary, the lien priorities would be "determined under nondiscriminatory
state laws."'o The Court made clear that this sort of reasoning would apply
more generally: barring "concrete reasons" to the contrary, "the prudent course
is to adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until
Congress strikes a different accommodation.""
Kimbell Foods set a new tone for federal common law. In subsequent cases,
the Court has made clear that there is a "presumption that state law should be
incorporated into federal common law" as the federal rule of decision" and that
the ultimate question is "whether the relevant federal interest warrants
displacement of state law."" Only in limited instances should courts "fill the
interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules."'"
As in Kimbell Foods, the question here -what law to apply to state agencies
carrying out cooperative federalism statutes -presents a situation where
"Congress has not spoken 'in an area comprising issues substantially related to
an established program of government operation.""s Courts should approach
the question in the same way they approach other questions of developing
federal common law. As Kimbell Foods suggests, the presumption should be to
adopt state law. Yet this presumption should be overcome "where there is a
7. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
8. Id. at 718.
9. Id.
1o. Id. at 740.
ii. Id.
12. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., soo U.S. go, 98 (1991).
13. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 (20o6).
14. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.
15. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 593 (1973)).
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'significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state
In this Note, we begin by presenting background on the history of
cooperative federalism statutes, the role of cooperative federalism today, and
the sources of administrative law. We then argue that the APA never
considered the role of state agencies in implementing federal law and examine
the inconsistent and reflexive way in which courts have applied administrative
law to state agencies implementing cooperative federalism statutes. Finally, we
explain how these issues can be better resolved and understood through the
Kimbell Foods framework.
I. LEGISLATIVE SILENCE AND JUDICIAL CHAOS
A. Cooperative Federalism and Administrative Law
The archetypal federal program involves federal agencies implementing
federal statutory law. But federal statutes that delegate responsibility to state
agencies make up a large and important part of the United States Code.
Although some cooperative federalism statutes, such as the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, existed prior to the New Deal," it was the New Deal that
"put the concept of a cooperative federalism on the map."', Most cooperative
federalism statutes passed during this period generally "involved the sharing of
funding, as opposed to regulatory authority" between the federal and state
governments. 9 By 1938, so-called grants-in-aid programs were already
providing funding for such diverse projects as "agricultural extension work in
the states, the training of teachers [of certain subjects], . . . experiments in
reforestation, the construction of highways, the equipment and training of the
National Guard, and other matters falling normally under the reserved powers
of the states."20
16. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
1. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938); see also Louis W. Koenig, Federal and State
Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 MICH. L. REv. 752, 773-74 (1938) (discussing early
cooperative federalism programs).
18. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L.
REv. 663, 669 (2001).
ig. Id.
2o. Koenig, supra note 17, at 756-57 (footnotes omitted).
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In other programs, the federal government explicitly enlisted state agencies
to carry out federal statutes." Even prior to the New Deal, the federal
government used state governmental actors to assist in the "apprehension of
fugitives from justice, the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act, [and]
public health administration."" The New Deal considerably expanded the
reach of these types of programs. 3 Perhaps most significantly, the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935 substantively involved state commissioners in much of the
administration of motor carrier regulation.
Still, the dominant regulatory model of the New Deal involved "national
bureaucracies directly regulat[ing] citizens and businesses in support of
national policies."" Programs involving cooperative federalism were seen as
"striking" experiments rather than the norm.26 According to one commentator,
the cooperative aspect of the Motor Carrier Act "would not have been feasible
and could scarcely have commended itself to congressional approval had not
the plan been solidly grounded on vital facts peculiar to the motor carrier
industry."1
This changed dramatically in the 196os and 1970s, when the federal
government passed an unprecedented number of regulatory statutes. In fact,
"[b]etween 1968 and 1978 Congress passed more regulatory statutes than it
had in the nation's previous 179 years.",,8 This regulatory expansion was
21. Id. at 772-73.
22. Id. at 773-74 (footnotes omitted).
23. See id. at 772-84.
24. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 502 (20o6));
Paul G. Kauper, Utilization of State Commissioners in the Administration of the Federal Motor
Carrier Act, 34 MICH. L. REv. 37 (1935).
25. Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays the Piper Should Call the Tune: Dual Sovereignty in U.S.
Environmental Law, 4 ENVTL. L. 779, 825 (1998).
26. See Kauper, supra note 24, at 37. Interstate Commerce Commissioner Clyde B. Aitchison
called the cooperative federalism of the Motor Carrier Act "a 'noble experiment' of the
decentralization of Federal power." PAT MCCARRAN, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 79-248, at 122 (2d Sess. 1946).
27. Kauper, supra note 24, at 40 (emphasis added).
28. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 5
(1983); see also Weiser, supra note 18, at 669-70 (describing some of the statutes enacted
during this period). Examples of cooperative federalism statutes passed during this era
include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2oo6)); the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (20o6)); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L.
No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006)); and the
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achieved without a "corresponding increase in national administration of
regulatory and service-provision programs," because ground-level
implementation of regulatory responsibilities under these statutes was
generally left to the states. 9 In many of these areas, federal laws encroached on
traditional areas of state regulation.3o Thus, federal statutes frequently
incorporated state regulators as a way of softening the increased role of the
federal government. Other statutes regulated new areas, but used states as an
efficient means of ensuring adequate and localized enforcement.
Congress continues to vigorously employ cooperative federalism structures.
For example, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires state agencies to
oversee interconnection agreements between telecommunications utilities
according to federal standards. 2 The most important statute in many years, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), is an even more prominent
example of a federal program engaging state agencies in cooperative
regulation. Cooperative federalism has been called the "dominant model for
federal environmental statutes,"3 4 and it is used in "such disparate programs as
Medicaid, OSHA, public utilities regulation, law enforcement licensure, online
Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
29. Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth
Century, 31 PUBLIUS 15, 29 (2001). Zimmerman also notes that "the federal government
directly administers few programs that it did not administer prior to 1935." Id.
30. Id. at 22 (noting that in 1965 Congress passed over 250 statutes preempting state authority);
see also JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION 63-74,
91-100 (1991) (discussing the nature and typology of federal statutes that encroach on state
authority).
31. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, for example, provides that "state
administrative agencies initially handle most . . . grievances" so as to "provide expeditious
resolution of discriminatory employment complaints." Yvonne T. Kuczynski, Note,
Administrative ResJudicata and the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1111, 1111 (1989) (citing Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 1-16, 81 Stat. 602, 602-608 (1967) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006))).
32. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the cooperative federalism aspects of
this Act, see Weiser, supra note 5.
33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the many
ways in which this statute grants state agencies authority, see Gluck, supra note 4, at 576-94.
34. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1811 (2008).
1287
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
pharmacy regulation, and hate crime enforcement."s3 Because state agency
authority is rarely revoked once given, it appears that cooperative federalism
will only become more widespread with time. 6 Cooperative federalism statutes
make up such a large portion of the law that any analysis of federal
administrative law excluding them would be incomplete.
Cooperative federalism is a broad category, with statutes distributing
responsibility between federal and state agencies in many different ways. For
our purposes, it may help to categorize cooperative federalism programs into
one of three stylized types, in order of increasing federal predominance:
(i) state agencies implementing state law subject to federal requirements and
oversight; (2) state agencies implementing state law, side-by-side with federal
law, subject to federal requirements and oversight; and (3) state agencies
implementing purely federal law, acting as a kind of contractor for the federal
program.
In the first category, the cooperative federalism statute offers state agencies
federal funding with strings attached. For example, the state might be required
to enact laws and regulations that meet certain specifications and make reports
to a federal agency tasked with supervision. Thus, in this category, state
agencies implement state law, which is shaped by federal law. This type of
statute is common in benefits programs,37 public housing,38 and education. 9
For example, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families4 o (TANF) is a block
grant program created in 1996 to replace the welfare entitlement program, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). TANF provides funding to aid
needy families. To be eligible, states must submit a written plan that meets
federal statutory requirements, such as describing the state's plan to "[r]equire
3s. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
179, 188 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
36. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1268 (2009) (theorizing that once state authority is given, such power will be cemented
because "federal dependence [should] increase as state bureaucrats develop institutional
competence and area-specific expertise"); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative
Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund
and the Problem ofPresidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61
DuKE L.J. 1599, 1654 (2012) ("[T]he empirical reality is that federal agencies almost never
suspend state primacy, once it is established.").
37. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-658 (2006) (Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families program); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396v (20o6) (Medicaid).
38. See, e.g., United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(g) (20o6).
3g. See, e.g., Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (20o6);
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. 5§ 601-658 (2006).
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a parent or caretaker receiving assistance under the program to engage in work
(as defined by the State) once the State determines the parent or caretaker is
ready to engage in work, or once the parent or caretaker has received assistance
under the program for 24 months."41
In the second category, state administrators implement federal law directly,
often while simultaneously implementing state law as part of the same larger
program of regulation.42 For example, the Clean Air Act requires participating
states to
enact legislation and regulations to implement the air quality standards
set by Congress and the EPA . . . [and] submit to the EPA an
implementation plan . . . . After the EPA approves a state's regulatory
and permitting program, the state agency becomes the primary
regulatory authority for interpreting and enforcing the program.43
Thus, under the Clean Air Act and similar programs, state agencies have
been delegated authority by both Congress and the state legislature. For
example, both federal and state law give participating agencies the authority
"to issue and enforce air pollution permits."'
In the third category, exemplified by Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI), state agencies implement exclusively or nearly exclusively federal law
using federal funding. For these programs, state agencies act almost as
contractors carrying out a federal mission.4s
This variety in cooperative federalism programs is part of the reason that a
nuanced, flexible rule modeled on Kimbell Foods is appropriate. As we shall
explore infra Section II.B, the goals and organizational structure of some
cooperative federalism programs will argue for more use of federal
administrative law, while others will argue for more state administrative law.
But in discussing these differences, we should not lose sight of the fact that all
cooperative federalism programs subject state agencies to federal requirements
that they would not otherwise face and present a question of whether
41. Id. S 602(a)(1)(A)(ii).
42. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §5 7401-7671q (20o6).
43. Sierra Club v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 787 N.W.2d 855, 860 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(describing 42 U.S.C. § 741o(a)(2)(A) (20o6)).
44. Id. at 861.
45. See Disability Determination Process, Soc. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/disability
/determination.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2012) ("The DDSs [Disability Determination
Services], which are fully funded by the Federal Government, are State agencies responsible
for developing medical evidence and making the initial determination on whether or not a
claimant is disabled or blind under the law.").
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administrative law principles should be uniform across the nation or state
specific.
B. The Law Today
1. The Hole in the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative law has long had many sources: substantive statutes,46
agency organic statutes, 7 the common law and equity powers of the courts,4
agency practice and regulation, and the Constitution." In 1946, Congress
added another source: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which codified
federal administrative law into one comprehensive framework that applies by
default to all programs and agencies.so
Constitutional constraints on the administrative state, such as the Due
Process Clause, apply to state and federal agencies alike. Agency-specific
requirements, meanwhile, can fairly be read to apply only to the agency they
concern. One can imagine a world in which Congress would have written the
APA to encompass state agencies administering federal programs. But, despite
the fact that state agencies play a vital role in the administration of federal law,
they are conspicuously left out of the APA. Under the APA, "agency" is defined
only as including "each authority of the Government of the United States."s' As
a result, the APA's rules regarding "agencies" simply do not apply to state
agencies." Although federal statutes that relied on state agency implementation
46. The Clean Air Act, for example, articulates a series of steps for how state and federal
agencies must proceed in establishing ambient air quality standards. See 42 U.S.C.
55 7401-7671q.
47. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499,
509 (2011) (discussing agency organic statutes).
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (holding that an administrative
agency may not generally make post hoc rationalizations to justify its orders).
49. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (articulating due process requirements for
administrative hearings). As Gillian Metzger discusses, it is not always clear when
administrative law is driven by constitutional concerns. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010). Metzger
argues that much of ordinary administrative law is constitutional, but that this is rarely
acknowledged by courts. Id. at 506.
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947).
51. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
s2. See Merryfield v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan., 439 F. App'x 677, 679 (loth Cir. 2011);
Hunter v. Underwood, 362 F.3d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 2004); Gilliam v. Miller, 973 F.2d 760,
1290
122:1280 2013
CURING THE BLIND SPOT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
did exist at the time the APA was passed in 1946,s" it appears that Congress did
not even consider whether state agencies should be included within the APA's
scope.
Throughout the entire legislative history of the APA, there is no debate
about whether to include state agencies within the scope of the statute, nor
even a mention of the fact that state agencies would not be covered.5 Perhaps
this was because, at the time, cooperative federalism statutes like the Motor
Carrier Act were still classified as "experiment[s]."ss Cooperative federalism
regimes were not nearly as prevalent as they would later become.s" Nor did
Congress say what law should apply to state agencies administering federal law.
By omitting state agencies from the APA's definition of "agency," then,
Congress determined, whether intentionally or not, that the APA's rules would
not directly govern state agencies.57 Because the APA totally excludes state
agencies from its mandate, federal requirements can only be applied to state
761 (9 th Cir. 1992); Sowell's Meats & Servs., Inc. v. McSwain, 788 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir.
1986); St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th Cir. 1981);
Johnson v. Wells, 566 F.2d ioi6, ioi8 (5th Cir. 1978).
53. See Koenig, supra note 17, at 774-75 (describing federal statutes, such as the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 19o6, that permitted implementation by state agencies).
54. See MCCARRAN, supra note 26. There is but one cryptic reference to cooperative federalism,
which comes from the testimony of Clyde B. Aitchison, the Commissioner of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. After discussing the proposed definition of "agency" in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Aitchison stated that "I should have called attention
also to the Motor Carrier Act which provides for State boards being given jurisdiction in a
'noble experiment' of the decentralization of Federal power, which is working and has
worked out very well." Id. at 122. Yet, before explaining why he should have called the
House Judiciary Committee's attention to this Act, Aitchison jumped ahead to another
problem: whether divisions within the hierarchy of the Interstate Commerce Commission
count as an "authority" for purposes of the APA. Id. Given the placement of his statement, it
appears that, if anything, Aitchison was suggesting that perhaps Congress should have
considered whether to include state boards carrying out directives of federal agencies within
its definition of agency. This seems especially possible given Aitchison's own extensive
experience with cooperative federalism. Prior to his appointment to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, Aitchison had acted as solicitor for the state railway commissions,
"and during that time the State commissions and the Interstate Commerce Commission
were working together in administering [an] act to make an evaluation of the railroads of
the United States." Id. at 88. But Congress did not pause to further investigate Aitchison's
fleeting comment.
55, Id. at 122.
s6. See Zimmerman, supra note 29, at 29 (describing how the government's vast regulatory
expansion enlisted states in statutory implementation).
57. The absence of state agencies from the APA also means that the APA does not provide a
cause of action against state agencies carrying out federal law. We discuss the implications
of this infra Subsection I.B.2.
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agencies as a matter of federal common lawss or through the requirements of
substantive federal statutes. This Note will focus on the common law question
because it is quite rare for substantive federal statutes to address the
administrative law doctrine that will govern state agencies.59 In fact, the only
statute we are aware of that does so is the Telecommunications Act, which
specifies that "[a] ny decision by a State or local government . .. to deny a request
to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in
writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record."'o
Even the Telecommunications Act does not specify how courts should defer to
interpretations of the Act by state agencies."
These gaps in the APA and cooperative federalism statutes have left courts
to determine for themselves how to sort out the application of the many
different procedural doctrines that fall under the umbrella of APA law.
Although more than sixty years have passed since the APA was first enacted,
Congress still has not spoken regarding the general applicability of federal
administrative law to state agencies that carry out federal law.
2. Why the Judicial Silence?
Although this question is present in a wide range of administrative law
doctrines across a variety of cooperative federalism statutes, there has been
little discussion of how it should be resolved. Judicial opinions give scant
attention to the issue of state agencies' role in implementing federal statutes.
The same can be said of the legal academy. Only Abbe Gluck has systematically
examined how state agencies implementing federal statutes should be treated
under federal law doctrines.6' And Gluck focused on only one aspect of the
58. In rare instances, state agencies may be deemed to be acting in the capacity of a federal
agency. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Miller, 973 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir. 1992) ("We agree that the
[Oregon Adjutant General's] personnel actions as supervisor over the federal civilian
technicians are taken in the capacity of a federal agency. . . . These cases, however, do not
support the proposition that the OAG's actions in supervising members of the state
National Guard are taken in the capacity of a federal agency." (citations omitted)).
59. See generally infra notes 76-157 and accompanying text.
60. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
61. See infra notes 105-142 and accompanying text.
62. Gluck, supra note 4, at 601-04; see also Weiser, supra note 5 (discussing the Chevron doctrine
in the context of state agency implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996);
Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869, 892-94 (2008) (discussing
whether state agencies should receive Skidmore deference when making statutory
interpretations regarding federal preemption of state law).
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problem: statutory interpretation.' No scholarship considers the broader
question of how choices should be made between state and federal law for the
broader set of administrative law doctrines that could conceivably be extended
to state agencies applying federal law.
In the following Subsection, we survey how courts have dealt with the issue
across an array of administrative law doctrines.14 However, before we address
the opinions themselves, it is useful to note the context in which these cases are
presented to the courts.
While state agencies may not be sued under the APA, plaintiffs may
challenge their actions using a variety of different methods. They may bring
Supremacy Clause challenges, arguing that state action is preempted by federal
law."s Alternatively, so long as the federal statute creates a private right of
action and does not include its own comprehensive enforcement mechanism,
they can bring a § 1983 action against state officials.66 In addition, the relevant
state or federal statutes may explicitly create a cause of action against the state
agency.6 ' Finally, plaintiffs might bring suit under the relevant state APA or
other general state administrative law.
Though there are many potential causes of action that plaintiffs can bring
against state agencies, for several reasons these suits will often not produce
debate about which source of administrative law should apply. First, and most
obviously, state and federal administrative law must diverge. If state and
federal law have the same administrative law doctrine for the question at issue,
or even if they are different but would yield the same result, there will be no
discussion of whether state or federal law applies. There are many cases in
63. See Gluck, supra note 4.
64. We should note that because of the many ways in which suits against state administrative
agencies implementing federal law may be brought and the many statutes under which they
may be sued, conducting a survey of judicial responses to this cooperative federalism
question is inherently difficult. We have done our best, but we hope that the understanding
reader will forgive us if we have missed relevant cases.
6s. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971). But see Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr.
of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1207 (2012) (declining "to decide whether Medicaid
providers and recipients may maintain a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause to
enforce a federal Medicaid law").
66. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that § 1983 actions are only
available when Congress intended to create a private right of action); Middlesex Cnty.
Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that § 1983 actions
are not available when the statute being sued under contains its own comprehensive
enforcement regime); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. i (1980) (establishing that § 1983
actions may be available whenever any federal law is allegedly violated).
67. See, for example, the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (20o6).
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which state and federal standards will yield similar results, both because of
natural convergence and because federal administrative law has exerted a
substantial influence on state administrative law.68 But there are also many
cases in which federal and state administrative law will differ. State APAs
largely "reject[ed] the federal act as a direct model," creating divergent
provisions governing many details.69 And even where the language of statutes
is identical, state courts could construe the text differently.7 o The bottom line is
that the choice of law matters infrequently enough that the question has flown
under the radar, but often enough that the failure to recognize it is a serious
problem.
Second, the Pennhurst doctrine must not have dissuaded the plaintiffs from
bringing suit against the state agency. Pennhurst bars unconsented suits in
federal court "against state officials on the basis of state law."7 Plaintiffs may
wish to sue both the federal and the state agency-for example, when they
believe that the federal agency has violated federal law in approving a state
implementation plan and the state agency has violated state law in its execution
of that plan.7 ' But Pennhurst prevents plaintiffs from bringing such a case in
federal court. Plaintiffs either have to bring only federal claims against the state
agency, dropping the state agency from the lawsuit, or bring the case in state
court, thereby forgoing a federal forum for their federal claim.74 Faced with this
dilemma, plaintiffs may choose to omit the state agency from the suit entirely.
68. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297,
297 (1986).
69. Id. at 302.
70. See MICHAEL AsiMow & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 592,
598 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing the stricter standard of review at the federal level in terms of
"hard look" review, which is sometimes not attributable to differences in the wording of the
standard); cf Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377 (2011) ("Federal and state courts,
after all, can and do apply identically worded procedural provisions in widely varying ways.
If a State's procedural provision tracks the language of a Federal Rule, but a state court
interprets that provision in a manner federal courts have not, then the state court is using a
different standard and thus deciding a different issue.").
7i. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
72. Id. at 1o6.
73. See, e.g., Mass. Fed'n of Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Massachusetts, 791 F. Supp. 899 (D. Mass.
1992) (addressing plaintiffs' challenge to federal approval of a state plan where plaintiffs'
challenge to the state agency's execution of the plan was previously dismissed on Pennhurst
grounds).
74. See Robert H. Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: The Eleventh Amendment, Erie, and Pendent
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Third, the cooperative federalism statute at issue must be silent on which
law should apply.75 As in all administrative law contexts, if the language of a
statute prescribes specific procedures, or a specific choice of law, then the text
of the statute usually governs authoritatively. But that is more a theoretical bar
to courts facing this question than a real one, because as discussed above, it is
rare for cooperative federalism statutes to specify which law should apply to
state agencies.
While none of these factors can entirely explain away the curious failure of
courts and commentators to address this question, they may have led to a
fragmenting of the doctrine that has made the issue more difficult to spot. The
question can arise under many statutes and, within a given statutory context,
will only sometimes be decisive. As a result, courts have addressed the question
in a haphazard manner rather than in an organized line of cases. In fact, courts
usually do not recognize the question of what law to apply at all. Perhaps they
sense that there is something there, but especially without proper briefing, it is
easier to ignore it. Meanwhile, since litigants have no case law to brief, they
may find it not worth their time to construct a whole new theory of
administrative law.
3. Courts' Discussion of the Doctrine
There are two main contexts in which courts face the question of whether
to apply state or federal administrative law: the standard of review for agency
action and the deference due to agency interpretations of statutes. Most courts
do not raise the question of which body of law should apply. Instead, they
apply the law that is most familiar to them. Federal courts generally apply
federal law to state agencies without considering whether state law might
apply; rather, they focus their inquiry on how to apply federal principles to
state agencies.' 6 State courts, by contrast, tend to apply state administrative lav
without considering whether federal law might apply.7
In practice, then, the law today depends on the forum. State agencies are
treated differently depending on whether they appear in state or federal
court.' This does violence to two of Erie's goals, "discouragement of forum-
7s. See, e.g., Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) (crafting a rule as to the
burden of proof when the substantive statute was silent on the issue).
76. See infra notes 81-147 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 81-147 and accompanying text.
78. One interesting question is whether litigants know this and behave strategically.
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shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.""
Furthermore, in this chaotic regime, the federal courts give too little
consideration to the value of comity toward state law, while the state courts
give too little consideration to potentially significant conflicts with the
ultimately overriding demands of federal law.
This pattern also provides insight into the debate in the federal courts
literature about parity.8o Our research shows that, at least in this area of
administrative law, state courts are not as solicitous of federal law as are the
federal courts. Yet this does not mean that state courts are necessarily any more
wrong than federal courts -here, both are insufficiently mindful of the other
sovereign's law.
i. Standard ofReview for State Agency Actions
The federal APA specifies a number of standards by which courts should
review agency action. The two most prominent standards are the substantial
evidence test," used to review formal adjudication and formal rulemaking, and
the arbitrary and capricious test," used for agency factfinding in informal
proceedings. While there is legitimate debate about the difference between
these standards," there is a general recognition that the federal courts have
moved from a deferential approach to a more scrutinizing, "hard look" review
of agency action. 4 By contrast, state courts are generally more deferential.!s
While "many states have moved much closer to the federal model, . . . few have
embraced true hard look review."81 At the most deferential end, Massachusetts
still follows the traditional state rule of upholding an agency decision if there
was any conceivable basis for it.8 7 Even when state and federal law both use the
79. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965).
8o. See generally Burt Neuborne, The Myth ofParity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that
state courts lack parity with the federal courts).
81. 5 U.S.C. 5 706(2)(E) (20o6).
82. Id. § 706(2)(A).
83. See, e.g., AsiMow & LEVIN, supra note 70, at 597-98.
84. Id. at 592.
85. Id. at 598-99.
86. Id. at 598.
87. Id. (citing Mass. Fed'n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 767 N.E.2d 549, 557-58 (Mass. 2002)).
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substantial evidence standard, case law may interpret the phrase "substantial
evidence" differently.88
Despite these differences, federal courts often apply federal standards to
state agency actions without acknowledging state doctrine at all.5 9 Some
federal courts have applied the federal substantial evidence standard of review
to state agency actions, while others apply an arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.90 Most circuits have done so without discussing why they are
applying the standard they do, instead merely citing authority from other
courts. 91 However, some courts have discussed the issue more substantively. In
GTE South, Inc. v. Morrison, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the
federal APA does not apply to state agencies, "the standards provided by that
act are not directly applicable."92 Nevertheless, it concluded that "[a]bsent a
statutory command, general standards for judicial review of agency action
apply."93 The court appeared to justify its choice of a substantial evidence
88. Compare Universal Camera v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (holding that substantial
evidence "means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion"), with Kennon v. Air Quality Board, 270 P.3 d 417, 424 (Utah 2009)
("A decision is supported by substantial evidence if there is a 'quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."'
(quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 38 P-3d 291, 298 (Utah
2001))), and Hilton ex rel. Pages Homeowners' Ass'n v. Dep't of Natural Res., 717 N.W.2d
166, 172 (Wis. 20o6) ("'Substantial evidence does not mean a preponderance of the
evidence.' Instead, the test is whether, after considering all the evidence of record,
reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion." (citation omitted) (quoting Madison
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 325 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 (Wis. 1982))).
89. E.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, 204 F.3d 1262, 1266-67 (9 th Cir. 2000)
(applying the substantial evidence standard to state agency factfinding in a suit under the
federal Telecommunications Act); GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 745 (4 th Cir.
1999) (same).
go. Compare cases cited supra note 89, with MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co.,
376 F. 3d 539, 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying arbitrary and capricious review in a
Telecommunications Act case).
91. See, e.g., U.S. W. Commc'ns v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 193 F-3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 1999)
(applying an arbitrary and capricious standard to all state agency actions besides statutory
interpretation in a Telecommunications Act case while citing a district court case from
another circuit and not otherwise justifying its reasoning); see also Ohio Bell, 376 F.3d at 548
(applying arbitrary and capricious review to agency factfinding in a Telecommunications
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standard in part because this standard would apply to the same actions if
undertaken by the federal agency implementing the underlying act.9 4
Courts applying the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard
have sometimes justified the choice by pointing to the state agency's technical
expertise in applying the law.95 In addition, when federal and state agencies act
together to carry out a federal statute, courts have cited the combination of
federal approval and state experience carrying out the statute as a reason to use
arbitrary and capricious review.96
Significantly, courts discussing the issue very rarely take state doctrine into
account." The opinion in GTE South illustrates the way many federal courts
reflexively apply federal law without inquiring into state doctrine. The GTE
South court applied the federal substantial evidence standard, which it
described as "consistent with our precedent concerning federal judicial review
of state-agency decisions.",8 However, the opinion it cited as precedent used
the substantial evidence test not because that was a blanket federal standard
that should apply, but rather because it determined that the state standard
should control, and North Carolina, the state in question, used the substantial
evidence test as its standard.99 Yet GTE South, which concerned a decision by
the Virginia State Corporation Commission, applied the federal substantial
evidence standard based on this precedent without ever inquiring into Virginia
law."oo It thus twisted prior precedent into a uniform federal rule in favor of
94. Id. ("The substantial evidence standard is, by the way, the same standard we would apply in
cases where arbitration under the Act is conducted by the FCC, rather than a state utilities
commission.").
95. See U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc. v. Hix, 986 F. Supp. 13, 19 (D. Colo. 1997).
96. E.g., Abbeville Gen. Hosp. v. Ramsey, 3 F-3d 797, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing an
alleged violation of the federal Medicaid law in a § 1983 action).
97. One rare exception is TCG Milwaukee, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 980 F. Supp. 992,
1003 (W.D. Wis. 1997), which applied the state standard of review. Specifically, the court
applied Wisconsin's arbitrary and capricious standard of review to a state agency arbitration
decision made under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. But the court provided no reason
why it did so, and other federal courts appear not to have followed its approach.
98. GTE S., 199 F.3d at 745 (quoting AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 172 F. 3d 307, 314 (4 th Cir. 1999)).
99. See AT&T Wireless, 172 F. 3d at 314. In this Telecommunications Act case, deference to the
state standard was supported by University of Tennessee v. Elliott's declaration that federal
courts must give agency factfinding the same preclusive effect that it is due in state court. Id.
(citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986)).
oo. GTE S., 199 F.3d at 745. Incidentally, Virginia also uses the substantial evidence standard,
see Va. Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (Va. 1983), but the key point is that
the court in GTE South arrived at its standard carelessly and for the wrong reasons.
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substantial evidence. The court's lack of inquiry into state doctrine is typical. In
one case considering a challenge to Virginia's Medicaid plan, a federal district
court noted that the APA did not apply to the state agency, but then
nevertheless proceeded to apply doctrine derived from the APA.o' Another
district court decided in a telecommunications case that the state agency's
"technical expertise" merited deference, and so it explicitly adopted the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing the state agency's application of
law to fact.o 2 It did not think to defer to the agency through the vehicle of state
law.
Just as federal courts generally do not look to state doctrine, state courts do
not look to federal doctrine.o 3 For example, in Sierra Club v. Department of
Natural Resources, a Wisconsin appeals court used the state's "substantial
evidence" standard when evaluating the state agency's findings of fact under
the Clean Air Act."1' The court never contemplated the possibility that, under
the Clean Air Act's cooperative federalism regime, a federal standard of review
might apply through federal common law to the Wisconsin state agency.
ti. Statutory Interpretation
One of the most important administrative law questions is when courts
should defer to the statutory interpretations of agencies. When a federal agency
10. Mary Washington Hosp., Inc. v. Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891, 897 (E.D. Va. 1985) ("[T]he
Court must defer to the agency's exercise of discretion unless it acts arbitrarily or
capriciously." (citing Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971))). But for contrast, see Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado Department of Social
Services, 842 F.2d 1158, 1162-64 (loth Cit. 1988), a Medicaid suit filed in state court and
removed under federal question jurisdiction, in which the court identified relevant state
doctrine but did not specifically base its determination on state law.
102. Bell Atl.-Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 227 (D. Del. 2ooo) ("The [state
agency]'s technical expertise in applying the Act's mandates to the complex facts of the
administrative record, however, deserves substantial deference. . . . Accordingly, the court
shall adopt the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's 'arbitrary and capricious' standard in
its review of the [agencyl's application of the law to the facts." (citations omitted)).
103. See Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 487 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div.),
affd, 489 N.E.2d 767 (N.Y. 1985) (referencing a New York state case to determine that the
standard of review for agency action is substantial evidence); Swan Super Cleaners, Inc. v.
Tyler, 549 N.E.2d 526, 531 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (applying the state's requirement that
agency orders be "supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence" to state
implementation of the Clean Air Act); Sierra Club v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 787
N.W.2d 855, 865 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (applying the state's substantial evidence standard to
agency factfindings made pursuant to the Clean Air Act).
104. Sierra Club, 787 N.W.2d at 865.
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interprets a statute that it is entrusted with implementing in an authoritative
manner (through rulemaking, for example), federal courts will defer to that
interpretation if the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is
reasonable.os This is Chevron deference. Federal courts may also give a weaker
form of deference, Skidmore deference, to less authoritative decisions by federal
agencies."o' State courts are typically less deferential to state agencies' statutory
interpretations. "Among state courts generally, the most prevalent attitude
toward deference on issues of law is some version of the weak deference
model .... A minority of jurisdictions follow Chevron.... Some state cases read
as though they will accord no deference whatsoever to administrative
views ... .107 How much deference, then, should state agencies receive for
their interpretations of cooperative federalism statutes? What law should
govern, state or federal?
Numerous courts have considered whether to defer to state agencies
interpreting federal law. os Five out of the six circuits that have considered the
issue have elected to give state agencies no deference and apply a de novo
standard of review.' 9 Courts have granted no deference in a variety of
cooperative federalism regimes - telecommunications, Medicaid, and public
housing. The courts have justified this lack of deference with a wide variety of
rationales. Some have argued that de novo review is compelled by United States
v. Mead Corp."o The Second Circuit argues that because "the question is
1os. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
106. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
107. AsiMow & LEVIN, supra note 70, at 526.
io8. See BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Sanford, 494 F.3d 439, 447-49 (4 th Cir. 2007)(Telecommunications Act); Qwest Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 427 F.3d lo61, 1o64
(8th Cir. 2005) (same); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F. 3d 491, 515-17 (3 d Cir.
2001) (same); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 208 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2000)
(same); GTE S., Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); Orthopaedic
Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1495 (9 th Cir. 1997) (a § 1983 suit for violations of the
Medicaid Act); Turner v. Perales, 869 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1989) (a suit alleging that the
calculation of New York public housing benefits violated federal housing law and
regulations, the Supremacy Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause); Bell Atl.-Del., Inc. v.
McMahon, 8o F. Supp. 2d 218, 227 (D. Del. 2000) (Telecommunications Act).
log. Compare Qwest, 427 F-3d at 1064, MCI, 271 F. 3 d at 515-17, Sw. Bell, 208 F. 3d at 482, GTE S.,
199 F.3d at 745, Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1495, and Turner, 869 F.2d at 141 (each
reviewing state agency interpretations de novo), with BellSouth Telecomms., 494 F.3d at
447-49 (granting deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
io. See, e.g., MCI, 271 F.3d at 517 ("Our conclusion not to accord deference to a state
commission's interpretation of the Act is enforced by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Mead which suggests that not every formal agency act involving interpretation of a federal
statute is entitled to deference.").
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whether the state law and implementing regulations are consistent with federal
law," the situation is analogous to preemption, where de novo review is
applied."' Others argue that Chevron's uniformity rationale does not apply to
state interpretations because cooperative federalism schemes "do[] not
envision any unitary or uniform application from state to state.".. One court
wrote that "deferring to state commission interpretations of [a cooperative
federalism statute] would lead to fifty different interpretations of the Act and
thereby frustrate Congress'[s] efforts to impose a degree of national
uniformity.""' Two courts have argued that Chevron's expertise rationale does
not apply because "[s]tate agencies have no expertise in interpreting federal
law."" 4 The Eleventh Circuit has gone so far as to say that a federal agency
does not merit Chevron deference when its interpretation is based on deference
to a state agency interpretation."s "If this Court were to defer to the FCC,
which had, in turn, deferred to the state commission, it would render our de
novo review of the state commission meaningless.""'
However, courts are not unanimous in granting state agencies no
deference. The Fourth Circuit grants state agencies Skidmore deference, citing
Philip Weiser's arguments for deference to state agency interpretations." 7 In a
Medicaid case where a federal agency had approved the state agency's actions,
the Second Circuit applied Chevron deference,"' though it is not clear if we
should understand that as deference to the state agency or the federal agency.
Federal courts' de novo review of state agencies' interpretations only
applies when state agencies construe federal law. When state agencies interpret
state law in their implementation of cooperative federalism statutes, federal
courts have given those interpretations deference under the arbitrary and
in. Turner, 869 F.2d at 141.
112. Id. ("Chevron's policy underpinnings emphasize . . . the need for coherent and uniform
construction of federal law nationwide."); accord Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F.3d at 1495-96
(quoting Turner, 869 F.2d at 141).
113. Bell Ad.-Del., 8o F. Supp. 2d at 227.
114. Id.; accord Orthopaedic Hosp., 103 F. 3d at 1495-96.
115. MCI Worldcom Commc'ns, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 446 F.3d 1164, 1172 (1ith
Cir. 2006) (Telecommunications Act).
116. Id.
117. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Sanford, 494 F.3d 439, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Weiser,
supra note 5, at 24-30).
118. Perry v. Dowling, 95 F.3d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In these circumstances, in which the state
has received prior federal-agency approval to implement its plan, the federal agency
expressly concurs in the state's interpretation of the statute, and the interpretation is a
permissible construction of the statute, that interpretation warrants deference.").
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capricious review standard."' Federal courts do not explain why they use this
standard rather than apply state deference doctrine to state agency
determinations of state law.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has remained silent on what deference to
grant state agencies, even though it has squarely addressed situations in which
the question was relevant. 2 o In Lukhard v. Reed, the Court upheld a state
agency determination of the meaning of the words "income" and "resources" in
the federal statute governing AFDC without even broaching the subject of
deference to the state.1' In Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services v.
Blumer, the Court again ignored the issue, despite declaring that its ruling
turned on statutory interpretation."' The Court's ruling upholding the state
agency action was supported in part by a proposed rule by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services declaring that "'in the spirit of Federalism,' the
Federal Government 'should leave to States the decision as to which alternative
to use."'1 2 3 The Court granted HHS's proposed rule Mead deference, but was
silent as to whether the state agency was itself due any deference.1' Although
this silence could be taken to mean that state agency determinations are
reviewed de novo, it seems more likely that the Court missed the issue entirely,
11g. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 208 F.3 d 475, 482 (5 th Cir. 2000) ("[O]ur review
of the PUC's state law determinations will be under the more deferential
arbitrary-and-capricious standard."); see Fitch v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 261 F. App'x 788,
791 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that "state law determinations by state commissions are
reviewed 'under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard,"' but then
recognizing "that there is no meaningful difference between the arbitrary and capricious
standard and the 'substantial evidence' standard" (quoting Sw. Bell, 208 F.3d at 482 & n.8);
Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., Inc., 339 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2003)(endorsing Southwestern Bell's approach); cf Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v.
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001), affd sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) ("As the [state] Department is charged with administering
the Maine Rx Program, we owe deference to its interpretation of the [state] Act."). It should
be noted that each of these cases concerned state agency interpretation of contracts. While
these situations are not exactly analogous to Chevron-style statutory interpretation, their
holdings appear to require deference for all "state law determinations."
120. See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (2002) (Medicaid);
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987) (a § 1983 suit alleging violations of federal welfare
law).
121. 481 U.S. at 381.
122. 534 U.S. at 489 ("The answer to th[e] question [presented], the parties agree, turns on
whether the words 'community spouse's income' in § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) may be interpreted
to include potential, posteligibility transfers of income from the institutionalized spouse
permitted by 5 1396r-5(d)(1)(B).").
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as neither party's brief addressed the issue, 2 s and neither the majority nor the
dissent cited any of the relevant circuit law.
In sharp contrast to the approach of federal courts, state courts generally
grant state agencies the same deference when interpreting a cooperative
federalism statute as when interpreting state law."' In doing so, state courts
entirely omit any discussion of federal case law. For example, in Keup v.
Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Services, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court applied the Wisconsin deference framework, which calls for either "great
125. Brief for Petitioner, Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952), 2001 WL 1025887; Brief of
Respondent, Blumer, 534 U.S. 473 (No. 00-952), 2001 WL 1424474.
126. See, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of San Diego Cnty. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3 d 128, 137 n.9 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[T]he parties do not argue [that Chevron deference]
applies to a state agency's interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Nonetheless, under
governing state law principles, we do consider and give due deference to the Water Boards'
statutory interpretations in this case."); Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Commerce
Comm'n, No. AA 677, 1986 WL 1170625, at *16-17 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Mar. 26, 1986) (applying
Iowa deference doctrine to the State Commerce Commission's implementation of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)); Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
114 A.D.2d 149, 153-54 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (applying New York deference doctrine to the
state Public Service Commission's actions implementing PURPA); Brazoria Cnty. v. Tex.
Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728, 734 (Tex. App. 2004) (applying state doctrine
that agency interpretation is entitled to "serious consideration" in a case under the Clean Air
Act); Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P. 3 d 719, 725 (Utah 2009)
(reviewing a state interpretation of the Clean Air Act and applying state doctrine "granting
little or no deference to the agency's determination"); Keup v. Wis. Dep't of Health &
Family Servs., 675 N.W.2d 755, 762-63 (Wis. 2004) (applying state doctrine to a state
agency's interpretation of federal Medicaid law, and ultimately deciding to grant no
deference because the issue was one of first impression before the agency); see also Albany
Law Sch. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 8
A.D. 3 d 145, 148-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011), affd as modified, 968 N.E.2d 967 (N.Y. 2012)
(holding that, under state deference doctrine, the state agency merited no deference for its
interpretation of a state statute "enacted in an effort to comply with the federal
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1984," because "[w]here, as
here, interpretation of the statutes does not depend on any specialized knowledge or
competence of the agency, no deference is accorded to the agency's interpretation");
Gardner v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 603 A.2d 279, 281 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (applying
state deference doctrine to a state agency's regulation interpreting a state law, the
Pennsylvania Surface Mining and Control Act, that had "been amended a number of times
to bring it into conformity with The Federal Surface Mining and Control Act"). But see
Voices of Wetlands v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 69 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 538-39
(Ct. App. 2007) (declaring cryptically that state agency interpretation is "relevant" while
citing-though not applying-the federal Chevron doctrine and not discussing state
deference doctrine); Martin v. N.C Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 670 S.E.2d 629, 632
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting two Fourth Circuit cases for the proposition that a "state
agency's interpretation of federal statutes is not entitled to the deference afforded a federal
agency's interpretation of its own statutes").
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weight" deference, "due weight" deference, or no deference. 2 Interestingly,
when the federal agency has weighed in, state courts have applied federal
deference doctrine without mentioning the state position.""
State court deference frameworks may be significantly different from
federal ones. As mentioned above, state courts generally follow the weak
deference model. 9 Some states differ even more. Utah, for example, grants
"little or no deference" to agency determinations, and has applied this standard
to cooperative federalism statutes. 3o A number of states explicitly take account
of agency expertise and other contextual factors in determining the appropriate
level of deference. In California, for instance, "[d]eference to administrative
interpretations always is situational and depends on a complex of factors ... ,
but where the agency has special expertise and its decision is carefully
considered by senior agency officials, that decision is entitled to
correspondingly greater weight."' In New York, the level of deference
depends on whether "the interpretation or application of a statute involves
specialized knowledge and understanding of underlying operational practices
or entails an evaluation of factual data, within the expertise of the agency
administering the statute," in which case great deference is granted, or whether
"the question is one of pure statutory interpretation," in which case no
deference is granted.' In Wisconsin, "[t]he weight that is due an agency's
interpretation of the law depends on the comparative institutional capabilities
and qualifications of the court and the administrative agency."' Despite this
potential divergence, when the Fourth Circuit declared that "an order of a state
commission may deserve a measure of respect in view of the commission's
experience [and] expertise, and the role that Congress has given it in the
Telecommunications Act," it decided that the best way to accord that respect
was to grant the state agency Skidmore deference, without even considering
whether the best way to accord it respect would be to grant it the deference
normally due the agency under state law. 4
127. Keup, 675 N.W.2d at 762-63.
128. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 472 N.E.2d 981, 986 (N.Y. 1984)
(adjudicating whether the state agency's determination was preempted by PURPA).
129. Aslmow & LEVIN, supra note 70, at 526.
130. See Utah Chapter ofSierra Club, 226 P.3d at 725.
131. Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P-3d 554, 568 (Cal. 2003) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
132. Albano v. Bd. of Tr., 780 N.E.2d 159, 161 (N.Y. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
133. State ex rel. Parker v. Sullivan, 517 N.W.2d 449, 461 (Wis. 1994).
134. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Sanford, 494 F-3d 439, 447-49 (4th Cir. 2007).
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Note that in many cases it is not clear whether the state is interpreting state
law, federal law, or both. For example, in Brazoria County v. Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality, the plaintiff challenged "several rules and orders" of a
State Implementation Plan developed pursuant to the Clean Air Act.' In that
case, the majority of the plaintiffs challenges were based entirely on state law,
but some of the causes of action depended on the resolution of federal law. In
other cases, the state law at issue may be a state statute, regulation, or plan
created pursuant to a federal statute."'
iii. Other Doctrines
This pattern, in which federal courts consider only federal law, recurs when
federal courts apply most other administrative law doctrines to state agencies
implementing federal law.
One prominent example is the doctrine flowing from Heckler v. Chaney's
holding that a federal agency's decision not to bring an enforcement action is
presumptively unreviewable in court."' One district court held that, because
Chaney and its ilk flow from the APA, and the APA does not apply to state
agencies, those cases do not apply to state agencies."' As a result, the court
held that the state agency's action was reviewable. Oddly, however, the court
did not consider whether state administrative law doctrines similar to Chaney
might make the state agency's action unreviewable.13 9 in a similar case, the
135. 128 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App. 2004).
136. See Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 114 A.D.2d 149, 153-54 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
137. 470 U.S. 821, 830-38 (1985). Courts are split on whether this presumption of
unreviewability flows from the APA or exists as a matter of federal common law. Compare
Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The presumption of agency
discretion recognized in Chaney has a long history and ... is not limited to cases brought
under the APA. When setting out the presumption in Chaney, the Supreme Court relied on
four prior cases, none of which had been brought under the APA."), with Occidental Chem.
Corp. v. Power Auth., 758 F. Supp. 854, 859 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) ("[Chaney's] exception to
judicial review [is] clearly developed from the language and legislative history of the APA.").
138. Occidental Chemical, 758 F. Supp. at 859. This case questioned whether the Power Authority
of the State of New York was authorized to raise certain utility rates by the federal Niagara
Redevelopment Act or by its license issued by the Federal Power Commission. The court
held that the broader "no law to apply" exception to judicial review, which encompasses
Chaney, flows from the APA and therefore does not apply to state agencies. Id. at 86o.
13. See id.
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Seventh Circuit ignored state law,' 4o despite acknowledging that "federal
courts are poorly equipped to set substantive standards for institutions whose
control is properly reserved to other branches and levels of government."14'
Similarly, many other reviewability cases cite federal precedent without
discussing whether different principles should apply to a state agency or
inquiring into the substance of state law. 14
This pattern holds for many other doctrines of administrative law,
including both APA-based doctrines and common law doctrines. For example,
GTE North v. McCarty'3 unquestioningly applied ripeness doctrine from Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner to a state agency, even though the reasoning of Abbott
Laboratories is heavily based on the federal APA.'4 Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
applied the federal common law rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp.4 s to support its
determination that a state agency should have discretion over whether to
announce a policy through a rulemaking or an adjudicatory proceeding.' 4 The
court never considered state law.47
iv. A Path Forward
There are a few cases where courts grapple with these issues in greater
depth. Both such cases we have found deal with the burden of proof in state
agency proceedings under federal law. In U.S. West Communications, Inc. v.
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, the district court reasoned that "normally
when a federal statute is silent as to the burden of proof in an administrative
proceeding, a court would turn to the [APA] to fill the void. However the APA
140. Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1034 (7 th Cir. 1987) (holding that a § 1983
class action alleging that the state's "fail[ure] to provide local districts with proper
guidelines for the identification and placement of LEP [Limited English Proficient] children
and . . . to monitor and enforce the local districts' compliance with the law" violated the
federal Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its regulations).
141. Id. at 1041.
142. See, e.g., GTE N. Inc. v. McCarty, 978 F. Supp. 827, 833-34 (N.D. Ind. 1997); GTE S., Inc. v.
Breathitt, 963 F. Supp. 610, 612 (E.D. Ky. 1997); GTE Nw., Inc. v. Nelson, 969 F. Supp.
654, 656 (W.D. Wash. 1997); GTE S. Inc. v. Morrison, 957 F. Supp. 8oo, 803-04 (E.D. Va.
1997). All of these cases are Telecommunications Act cases.
143- 978 F. Supp. at 836-38.
144. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
145. 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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does not apply to these proceedings because the [Minnesota Public Utilities
Commission (MPUC)] is not a federal agency."', 8 The court explained that
because state law was not "explicitly on point," the MPUC had been forced to
fashion a new rule for the burden of proof.' 9 Ultimately, the court accepted
the MPUC's conclusion because it felt it was reasonably consistent with the
principles of both federal common law and Minnesota common law.'
The Supreme Court itself discussed the issue of how to treat state agencies
applying federal law in Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast,s'5 which considered the
burden of proof in a state hearing before an administrative law judge under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The administrative law
judge had ruled in favor of a school district on the grounds that the evidence
was close and the parents bore the burden of persuasion. The parents then
challenged the result through a civil action in federal district court, as provided
for by the IDEA."s2 Since the statute was silent on the issue, the Court applied
the default federal rule. "Absent some reason to believe that Congress intended
otherwise, therefore, we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where
it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief."' 3 The respondent school district
and several state amici argued that, rather than applying the federal rule, the
Court should defer to state law.'54 Although other states had issued statutes or
regulations covering the matter, the Court reasoned that "[b]ecause no such
law or regulation exists in Maryland [the jurisdiction in question], we need not
decide this issue today."155
Justice Breyer's dissent drew upon the broader jurisprudence of federal
common law, which teaches that only in limited instances should courts "fill
the interstices of federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules."s5 In
general, courts should borrow state law. Here, Justice Breyer argued that that
presumption applied with full force:
148. 55 F. Supp. 2d 968, 987 (D. Minn. 1999).
149- Id.
i5o. Id.
151. 546 U.S. 49 (2005).
152. The IDEA provides that, in a due process hearing in front of a state administrative law
judge, any aggrieved party may bring a civil action in state or federal court. 20 U.S.C.
§ 141S(i)(2) (2006).
153. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57-58.
154. Id. at 61.
155. Id. at 61-62.
156. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
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Nothing in the [IDEA] suggests a need to fill every interstice of the
Act's remedial scheme with a uniform federal rule. . . . Most
importantly, Congress has made clear that the Act itself represents an
exercise in "cooperative federalism." Respecting the States' right to
decide this procedural matter here, where education is at issue, where
expertise matters, and where costs are shared, is consistent with that
cooperative approach."
Justice Breyer's dissent suggests a way that courts can apply administrative
law to cooperative federalism statutes while taking account of the demands of
both federal and state law. In Part II, we develop this framework.
II. ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
As we have demonstrated, courts have not adequately considered what law
should apply to state agencies challenged under cooperative federalism
statutes. But what should their answer be? In principle, the courts could take
three different types of approaches: (1) adopt a blanket rule applying either
federal or state law; (2) adopt a presumption in favor of either federal or state
law that could be overridden by considerations specific to the statutory regime
and administrative law doctrine at issue; or (3) adopt no general rule or
presumption and instead focus entirely on the contextual factors of the statute
and administrative law doctrine at issue. In this Part, we first show that the
teachings of federal common law and the principles of practical governance
they embody point toward a version of the second option in which courts
presume that state law applies but engage in a contextual analysis to determine
whether this presumption would create a significant conflict with federal
policy. We then explore what this approach would look like in practice. Finally,
we conclude with questions for further research.
At the outset, we note that the question of what law courts should apply in
the absence of congressional direction is a separate question from
what direction Congress should give. Courts are forced to determine the
choice-of-law question for themselves because Congress has mostly been silent,
but Congress could decide to speak. Since Congress generally has not done so,
we suggest a framework for how courts should proceed in the face of current
ambiguity.
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A. The Kimbell Foods Presumption in Favor ofState Law
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., the Supreme Court held that "when
Congress has not spoken 'in an area comprising issues substantially related to
an established program of government operation,' . . . courts [must] fill the
interstices of federal legislation 'according to their own standards."'"" Drawing
from Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, the Court explained that federal law
governs these situations, so courts must fashion federal common law to resolve
areas of legislative silence. Our question-what law should govern state
agencies implementing cooperative federalism statutes - is such an area of
legislative silence where the courts must fashion federal common law.
Clearfield first clearly established that federal courts have authority to craft
federal common law in such circumstances, and that in doing so they may
either fill gaps with state law or craft uniform federal rules."' In Clearfield, the
Court had to decide what law should govern a suit by the United States to
recover the value of a stolen check that had been issued by the Treasury. The
Court held that state law did not apply directly through Erie because "[t]he
authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes
of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania
or of any other state."io Thus, "[t]he duties imposed upon the United States
and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the
same federal sources.",,6' These federal duties, combined with the "absence of
an applicable Act of Congress," gave the federal courts authority to make
federal common law-that is, "to fashion the governing rule of law according
to their own standards.",,6 ' But while the legal question was inherently federal,
the Clearfield Court noted that courts were free to borrow the substantive rule
from state law. 6 , Clearfield itself declined that invitation, observing that the
need for uniformity in the law governing federal commercial paper made it
inappropriate to borrow law from the various states."6
I58. 44o U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
58o, 593 (1973); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
is. See Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367; see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547
U.S. 677, 690 (20o6) ("Clearfield is indeed a pathmarking precedent on the authority of
federal courts to fashion uniform federal common law on issues of national concern.").
16o. Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 366.
161. Id.
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The general framework of Clearfield has held up over time. 6s But its
emphasis on uniformity has been met with withering criticism. As Paul
Mishkin has pointed out, federal common law is unlikely to result in true
uniformity because the Supreme Court can review so few of the cases heard in
the appellate courts.' 66 Moreover, while uniformity may matter for particular
legislative problems, "not infrequently the call for 'uniformity' seems basically
to represent a desire for symmetry of abstract legal principles and a revolt
against the complexities of a federated system of government.",6 , Perhaps most
importantly, by imposing a uniform rule for federal commercial paper, the
Court in Clearfield missed a competing uniformity: that of banking
transactions within a specific state.' 6 8 Under Clearfield, citizens of any given
state were forced to operate under two different banking systems with different
rules, one involving federal notes and one involving state notes.
In light of these problems, the Court found a different solution to a similar
situation in Kimbell Foods. Faced with the question of how to resolve lien
priority for liens stemming from federal programs, the Court reasoned that "a
national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal interests underlying the
[federal] loan programs."170 Instead it declared that, "absent a congressional
directive to the contrary," the lien priorities would be "determined under
nondiscriminatory state laws."17' The Court made clear that this sort of
reasoning would apply more generally: absent "concrete reasons" to the
165. Martha A. Field has criticized the two-step inquiry of Clearfield, in which courts first
determine whether they have the authority to craft federal common law, and second
determine whether that law should take federal or state law as its source. See Martha A.
Field, Sources ofLaw: The Scope ofFederal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881, 950-51 (1986)
(arguing that the two-step inquiry should only be one step because courts always have the
power to use state law). In at least one recent decision, the Court quietly collapsed these two
inquiries into one, per Professor Field's argument. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,
215-16 (1997). Our argument is premised on the assumption that when state agencies are
sued for violations of federal law, federal courts have the authority to craft federal common
law, and that the difficult question is what the substance of the law should be.
166. See Paul Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 813 (1957).
167. Id.; see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 410 (1964) (arguing that the Supreme Court jumped over the
uniformity point "rather quickly and not altogether convincingly").
168. Friendly, supra note 167, at 410 ("[T]he question persists why it is more important that
federal fiscal officials rather than Pennsylvanians dealing in commercial paper should have
the solace of uniformity.").
169. Id.
170. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 44o U.S. 715, 718 (1979).
171. Id. at 74o.
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contrary, "the prudent course is to adopt the readymade body of state
law as the federal rule of decision until Congress strikes a different
accommodation." 117
The Court has subsequently elaborated on the Kimbell Foods presumption
in favor of state law. The ultimate question is "whether the relevant federal
interest warrants displacement of state law."'" There is a "presumption that
state law should be incorporated into federal common law" as the federal rule
of decision.'74 Only in limited instances should courts "fill the interstices of
federal remedial schemes with uniform federal rules." 7 Cases meriting the
"judicial creation of a special federal rule . . . are . . . 'few and restricted,' [and]
limited to situations where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law.'"" 6
Thus, through Kimbell Foods and subsequent cases, the Court established a
general set of ground rules that call for a presumption in favor of state law
when creating federal common law.
As with the federal loan program at issue in Kimbell Foods, cooperative
federalism statutes create situations where "[g]overnment activities 'arise from
and bear heavily upon a federal program.""77 Likewise, in many situations,
they "'require' otherwise than that state law govern of its own force.""7
Admittedly, cooperative federalism cases sound in public law, whereas the
Kimbell Foods cases sounded in tort, contract, and property -private law.
However, as we will show, Kimbell Foods makes sense in the public law context,
too. It teaches that courts should adopt state law unless doing so presents a
significant conflict with federal policy.
172. Id.
173. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 692 (2oo6).
174. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. go, 98 (1991).
175. Id.
176. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Wheeldin
v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966)).
177. Kimbell Foods, 44o U.S. at 727 (quoting United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 592 (1973) (internal punctuation marks omitted)).
178. Id. (quoting Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 593).
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B. The Value ofthe Kimbell Foods Presumption in the Cooperative
Federalism Context
In the previous Section, we explained why, doctrinally, Kimbell Foods
governs what law should apply when state agencies are sued for violations of
cooperative federalism statutes. This Section explains why the Kimbell Foods
rule-a presumption in favor of state law-is also desirable. Here, as in the core
Kimbell Foods cases, state law will usually be most appropriate, but there will be
cases in which applying state law would undermine the policy objectives
behind the statute in question. Courts should adopt a middle ground in which
they presume that state law governs but adopt federal law when doing
otherwise would present a significant conflict with federal policy.
A blanket rule for state law would too often do violence to compelling
federal interests, while a blanket rule for federal law would too often do
violence to state interests. Blanket rules would also be blind to the tremendous
variety of cooperative federalism statutes and questions of law. In contrast, a
totally flexible, contextual inquiry with no presumption would undermine
consistency and predictability in the law while ignoring the fact that state law is
more often appropriate. In this Section, we first explain why cooperative
federalism regimes should mostly use state law. Second, we explain why that
tendency should not be so strong as to become a blanket rule.
1. Why Cooperative Federalism Should Lean Toward State Law
Kimbell Foods has been developed in the private law context and calls for a
presumption in favor of state law in part because application of a federal rule
might "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law."' 79 So why
should the same presumption apply in the public law context of cooperative
federalism, where bargaining reliance is rarely an issue?"o We suggest four
reasons.
First, state agencies, just like business entities, expect to operate under a
uniform and predictable set of rules. For example, if a state agency has
structured its quasijudicial processes (e.g., how it gathers evidence) to meet a
state "soft look" review rather than federal "hard look" review, the agency
would either have to change its processes when federal issues were at stake, or
it would see its federally inflected decisions struck down at a higher rate.
179. Id. at 729.
18o. Some disputes between private parties might turn on the legality of agency action, and in
those cases bargaining reliance could be relevant.
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Predictability could be an issue too, since sometimes it is not clear whether an
agency is acting in its purely state capacity or in its cooperative federalism
capacity. If the agency cannot predict what law will govern judicial review of its
cooperative federalism actions, it will not be able to structure its processes
intelligently. Moreover, when a state agency acts pursuant to both federal and
state law, as is often the case, it could be subject to two separate and potentially
conflicting standards for the same action, depending on whether plaintiffs sued
under the state or the federal law.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that state courts and legislatures, in
developing administrative law doctrines to oversee their agencies, have taken
the characteristics of their agencies into account in a way that uniform federal
rules could not. For example, in a state with a notoriously corrupt or
incompetent public utilities commission, or just a poor civil service generally,
the state legislature or courts may have developed a stricter standard of review,
whereas a state whose appointment rules lead to a well-respected commission
may be more deferential. State deference doctrine may also take account of
internal variation in state institutions. In a number of states, deference doctrine
explicitly takes into account contextual factors such as the role of agency
expertise and senior agency officials in the decision.'' This flexible deference
standard may be a wise adaptation to the varying quality of agency action that
those state courts have seen over the years. (Of course, it could also be a
similarly wise course for the federal courts to adopt with respect to federal
agencies.) Another good reason for state deference doctrine to differ from
federal deference doctrine is that the heads of state agencies are often directly
elected by the people, and therefore directly accountable to them, while the
heads of federal agencies are never elected."' As a result, the courts may need
to play less of a role in checking potentially arbitrary administrative action. In
the face of carefully considered state adaptations, the federal government
would be wise not to impose federal rules -which are adapted for a different
set of institutions -unless there is a strong case for such interference.
Third, the Constitution values the independence of state institutions. Thus,
"Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program" nor "circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State's
officers."'" In fact, state interests are at their height when the governance of
181. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
182. Bernard W. Bell, The Model APA and the Scope ofJudicial Review: Importing Chevron into
State Administrative Law, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 8o, 824 n.130 (2011) ("In many states there
are several elected statewide officials in addition to the governor.").
183. Printzv. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
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state institutions is concerned: "[E]ven where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those
acts."
Of course, Congress does create cooperative federalism programs in which
federal law directs state agencies. It usually does so either by conditioning the
receipt of federal funds on certain behavior"' or by "offer[ing] States the
choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal standards or having state
law pre-empted by federal regulation.",,1 In addition, Congress can command
states using its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,'
impose requirements on states and private parties alike,' 88 or order state
officials to comply with federal commands, enforceable by injunctions sought
by private parties. 9
Once a lawful cooperative federalism program is in place, a state cannot
claim some sovereign freedom from federal direction. But the deference due to
state institutions is a constitutional value that should not disappear from the
picture. Courts should give it real weight when deciding whether to adopt state
or federal law. And, in this context, this value holds greater sway than in the
situation originally contemplated by the Kimbell Foods line of cases, because it
involves control over state institutions rather than simply state laws. The
presumption that state principles usually govern challenges to state agency
action while federal principles govern challenges to federal agency action
respects the importance of both state and federal governments in cooperative
federalism programs. And it respects the legislative intent of both elected
bodies by allowing legislatures to specify principles of review that govern the
agencies they create.
Fourth, congressional silence may itself indicate an intent for state law to
apply. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., which provided much of the
foundation for Kimbell Foods, the Court reasoned that "it may fairly be taken
that Congress has consented to application of state law, when acting partially
in relation to federal interests and functions, through failure to make other
184. NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
i8. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
186. New York, 505 U.S. at 173-74.
187. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, . . . are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
188. New York, 505 U.S. at 16o.
189. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed."' 90 Since state agency
actions are ordinarily governed by state law, the absence of any language
governing state agencies in the APA and Congress's continued silence can be
interpreted as another example of this form of acquiescence. Of course, this
argument should not be taken too far - since Congress will often not have
noticed an issue, its silence should not be dispositive when purposive reasons
are to the contrary."' But Congress's silence should strengthen the
presumption in favor of state law, especially as recognition of this issue grows.
2. Why Not a Blanket Rule in Favor of State Law?
Why not always adopt state administrative law as the rule of decision?
Again, the Kimbell Foods line of cases provides an answer: sometimes, applying
state law will present "a significant conflict" with a "federal policy or
interest."' 2 For example, if state deference doctrine allows agencies such wide
latitude in interpretation that giving them that deference would mean
dramatically different interpretations in different states, and the statutory
regime in question strongly demands uniformity, then state deference doctrine
may need to be displaced by deference doctrine shaped in the federal courts.
The courts should not use their common law powers to adopt state
administrative law that would undermine a statute duly enacted by Congress.
One could argue in favor of a clear statement rule: if Congress wants
federal administrative law to govern state administrative agencies, it should
have to say so explicitly. But this is unreasonable. First, until this Note was
written, the issue was simply not recognized, so we cannot say that Congress
was on notice or that Congress definitively meant anything through its silence.
Second, going forward, Congress could not possibly anticipate every situation
in which this question might arise. A judicially created blanket rule would
either force judges to apply state law in a manner contrary to how Congress
would have spoken if it had thought of the issue, or it would encourage
Congress to create a default rule of its own -but there is no good reason for the
courts to so pressure the legislature.
We have shown that it will often be important for state law to govern, but
also that federal law must be supreme where state law presents a significant
conflict with federal policy. Of course, what it means to present a significant
190. 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947).
191. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
192. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
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conflict with federal policy is not at all obvious on its face. In the next Section,
we draw on the Kimbell Foods line of cases to flesh out that concept in the
context of cooperative federalism.
C. How Kimbell Foods Should Work in the Cooperative Federalism Context
Under the Kimbell Foods framework, there are three main ways in which a
federal policy may warrant displacement of state law:
[1] the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide
legal standards, or when
[2] express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody
congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at
hand ... [or when]
[3] "application of the particular state law in question would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs."
We discuss these sources of conflict in turn.
1. Uniformity
The first exception to the presumption in favor of state law applies where
there is a "distinct need for nationwide legal standards." 94 But that need must
truly be distinct-courts will "reject generalized pleas for uniformity." 95
Today's Supreme Court is often dismissive of uniformity arguments, calling
uniformity "that most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal
interests.",I9 6 Even cases involving federal government contracts no longer
automatically merit uniform federal rules. 97 Moreover, for a federal policy to
be a "genuinely identifiable" one meriting a uniform federal rule, it cannot be
"judicially constructed,",98 because "'[w]hether latent federal power should be
193. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (citations and alterations
omitted) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 44o U.S. 715, 728 (1979)). The
Kimbell Foods presumption is also overridden if state law discriminates against federal law.
Kimbell Foods, 44o U.S. at 739.
194. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.
195. Kimbell Foods, 44o U.S. at 730.
196. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 88.
197. Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691 (20o6).
198. O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 89.
1316
122:1280 2013
CURING THE BLIND SPOT IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress,' not the
federal courts." 99
In general, cooperative federalism regimes are less likely than other federal
statutes to require a uniform federal rule.2 o If Congress wanted a uniform,
national solution badly enough, it could have granted full authority to a
national regulatory agency.20 1 Congress's choice to involve state agencies in its
regulatory scheme shows a desire, or at least a willingness, for implementation
to vary according to the preferences and characteristics of state institutions and
interests.20 Cooperative federalism regimes often grant state agencies wide
latitude in implementation. As Philip Weiser has observed, "the very point of
cooperative federalism schemes ... is to allow states to adopt the approach that
they deem to be the optimal regulatory strategy . . . whenever the statutory
scheme authorizes them to make that decision in the first instance."20 3
Still, even in the cooperative federalism context, there will be situations
that cry out for a uniform federal rule. Ultimately, the judgment must be
specific to the matter presented before the court. 0 4 The specifics of both the
cooperative federalism regime and the type of agency action will be relevant.
As discussed earlier, the relative importance of state versus federal law
varies tremendously among cooperative federalism programs. When state
agencies implement state law subject to federal requirements and oversight, as
in the case of many benefits, public housing, and education programs,
199. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
zoo. Cf Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946) ("But Congress,
in permitting local taxation of the real property, made it impossible to apply the law with
uniform tax consequences in each state and locality. For the several States, and even the
localities within them, have diverse methods of assessment, collection, and refunding.").
2o. Weiser, supra note 5, at 36. Of course, the decision to use a cooperative federalism regime
does not necessarily mean that Congress was opposed to centralized authority. Other factors
may have been relevant. For example, Congress may have decided that there was no federal
agency already in existence with the ability to implement the program in full, and that




204. This is in accord with Gluck's suggestion of a statute-specific approach to determining
whether state agencies should receive Chevron deference. "The extent to which one might
recommend deferring to state agency interpretations of federal law, for example, likely
should turn on why Congress uses the state agency implementers in the first place." Gluck,
supra note 4, at 565.
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Congress has probably already given up on true uniformity.os By contrast,
when state agencies operate entirely according to federal law and with federal
funding, as in the case of SSDI, Congress has prioritized uniformity. In more
hybrid regimes such as workplace safety and environmental programs, state
agencies implement federal law directly, often side-by-side with state law.2os
These will be the hardest cases, requiring a more detailed look at the
importance of uniformity to the program and how uniformity would be
affected by the adoption of a state rule in the particular administrative law
doctrine in question. The demand for uniformity may even vary within a
regulatory regime, if some parts rely more heavily on state implementation
than others.o7
The more local an issue is, the less it will demand uniformity. Ideally,
Congress will have emphasized state law in areas where an issue is more local
and federal law where the issue is more regional or national. For example, the
vast majority of education funding, policy, and practice is determined by state
and local governments.2os If the burden of persuasion in proceedings under
the IDEA were determined by state law, as Justice Breyer proposed in
Schaffer,2 9 that would be just a tiny sliver of state law's predominance in
education -and since our educational policy accepts the dominant role of state
government, state administrative law doctrines would rarely present any
significant conflict with federal policy. By contrast, federal laws governing
environmental pollution partly seek to create a consistent set of rules for
businesses in a national marketplace and to avoid races to the bottom between
states, so uniformity is more important.2 "o
205. See Disability Determination Process, supra note 45.
206. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (20o6); Sierra Club v. Wis. Dep't of Natural
Res., 787 N.W.2d 855, 86o (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (describing 42 U.S.C. 5 7410(a)(2)(A)); see
also Sarah D. Himmelhoch, Comment, Environmental Crimes: Recent Efforts To Develop a
Role for Traditional Criminal Law in the Environmental Protection Effort 22 ENVTL. L. 1469,
1490-91 (1992) ("State agencies can regulate worker safety in two ways: a state may submit
its own enforcement plan to the Department of Labor for approval, thereby acquiring
jurisdiction over safety and health violations governed by federal law; or a state agency can
assert jurisdiction over an area of occupational health and safety that is not covered by a
federal standard.").
207. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 577.
208. See Richard Briffault, The Role ofLocal Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REv.
773 (1992)-
209. 546 U.S. 49, 70-71 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
a1o. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 195
(2oo); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining& Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981);
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The strength of the demand for uniformity will also depend on the
administrative law doctrine in question. It should rarely be necessary to
displace state law and create uniform federal rules regarding the standard of
review of a state agency action involving the application of law to fact. Recall
the standard of review cases discussed supra Subsection I.B.3. In many of these,
federal courts were reviewing the decision of a state public utilities commission
on whether an interconnection agreement between two telecommunications
providers met the requirements of the Telecommunications Act. While the Act
may demand uniformity in some areas, it is hard to imagine how it would
demand uniformity in the standard of review applied to state public utility
commission decisions. After all, other differences between state commissions
will do much more to create diversity in the law's application. Different
agencies will have different compositions, expertise, policy goals, institutional
cultures, staffing resources, and procedures, to name but a few salient
distinctions. If Congress accepted these differences by setting up a cooperative
federalism scheme, it is hard to claim that different standards of review are a
bridge too far. In fact, given the differences between state agencies, it may well
be wise for federal courts to use the standards that state courts have adopted to
oversee their administrative agencies."
By contrast, deference doctrine will often demand uniformity. As discussed
supra Subsection I.B.3, federal courts generally do not give state agencies
deference when interpreting federal law. If state law were applied to grant
greater deference, it would widen the range of permissible statutory
interpretations, such that the same statutory text could mean substantially
different things in California and Kansas. Statutory interpretation occurs at a
higher level of generality than the application of law to facts and therefore has
greater policy implications. Where Congress seeks to create uniform national
standards, for example, in order to ease compliance costs for businesses or to
avoid races to the bottom by state agencies, such diversity of law could pose a
significant conflict with a federal policy. In addition, we generally assume that
the same text from the same authority should mean the same thing to different
implementers. Maintaining that assumption here would be entirely reasonable.
That said, whether a diversity of interpretations would actually lead to a
significant conflict with federal policy sufficient to displace state law will
depend on the statutory regime in question. If the IDEA were interpreted
somewhat differently in different states, that would probably be fine -there is
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222 (1992).
211. Here, "standards" should be read to mean both formal standards -arbitrary and capricious,
substantial evidence, etc. - and the case law that gives those standards content and meaning.
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already a tremendous difference in the education disabled children receive, so it
is difficult to justify a hard stand for uniformity in interpretation. But if
environmental emissions laws were interpreted differently, it would undermine
the creation of a nationwide marketplace.m'
Some commentators have argued for giving state agencies deference under
a federal standard. 13 But the application of a federally imposed standard of
deference does not evince the respect for state institutions that Kimbell Foods
teaches. Rather, Kimbell Foods teaches that such respect, where it does not
conflict with a federal policy, entails the adoption of state law to determine the
deference due state agencies. In some cases, this might mean little deference is
granted. In general, state law grants state agencies weak deference, not the
strong Chevron deference that federal law grants federal agencies."' Utah, for
example, gives its agencies "little or no deference."21s A uniform federal
deference standard would, in at least some cases, grant state agencies more
deference than that to which they would be entitled under state law. This
would run counter to states' ability to set standards for their own agencies,
incentivize the agencies to act pursuant to federal rather than state law, and
perversely imply that state agencies are more authoritative interpreters of
federal law than of state law.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine a need for uniformity sufficient to displace
state law that would simultaneously allow the creation of a federally sourced
rule granting deference to state agencies. After all, where uniformity is needed,
what is needed is not uniformity in deference standards per se, but rather
uniformity in the interpretation of substantive law. Thus, the appropriate
choice is whether to invoke federal law to grant no deference, invoke federal
law to limit state law-based deference, or apply state deference law in all its
variegated ways.
Applying state law doctrines of deference to state agencies will raise several
distinctive issues. First, courts will have to determine who should receive
deference when state and federal agencies disagree.' This may turn on which
212. An interesting and related question is what deference states grant local implementers of state
law. The answer might provide insight into what deference federal law should grant state
implementers of federal law.
213. See Gluck, supra note 4; Weiser, supra note 5, at 22-38.
214. AsiMow & LEVIN, supra note 70, at 526.
215. Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P.3d 719, 725 (Utah 2009).
216. Federal agencies might be able to assert themselves by regulation, but there are at least two
limits on this power. First, constraints on resources and foresight dictate that agencies will
not anticipate every situation when crafting regulations. Second, it is simply not clear that
federal agencies are the privileged interpreters in all cooperative federalism contexts. See
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agency Congress delegated greater "authority . . . to make rules carrying the
force of law." 17 Second, less deference might be due state agencies interpreting
whether a federal statute preempts state authority."' Courts might address this
issue by, for example, affording state agencies no more than Skidmore deference
in such a situation. Third, this issue raises the question of whether state
agencies should receive Auer-like deference for their interpretation of federal
regulations."9
2. Readily Applicable Analogous Statutes
The second exception to the presumption in favor of state law applies
"when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody
congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand."22 o Where
Congress establishes a policy in an analogous statutory scheme, a significant
conflict with that policy may be sufficient to justify a federal rule of decision. At
the same time, we should remember that "the existence of related federal
statutes [does not] automatically show that Congress intended courts to create
Gluck, supra note 4, at 599-601 (raising the question of whether there should be "a
limitation on Chevron's breadth for federal agencies in the intrastatutory federalism
context").
217. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006) (holding that "[d]eference in accordance with
Chevron, however, is warranted only 'when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law"' (quoting United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001))).
218. See Young, supra note 62, at 892-94. Young's article is focused on what deference federal
agency interpretations regarding preemption should receive, but his brief discussion of state
agencies is illuminating:
In many cases, the state action may display the same sorts of decisional qualities
-thorough consideration, consistency with past practice, thoughtful reasoning,
or even policy expertise-that counsel deference under Skidmore. Skidmore
deference, in other words, is not in principle confined to federal governmental
entities. A court applying Skidmore could well conclude that a state agency's
interpretation of the underlying federal statute as not preempting the state law
possessed greater indicia of reliability than did a contrary decision by a federal
agency, with the result that the court should defer to the state decisionmaker.
Id. at 892.
219. There are two distinct issues here: first, whether federal law, when it applies, should treat
state agencies as privileged interpreters of relevant federal regulations; and second, whether
state law, when it applies, has a concept of Auer-like deference. Cf Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452 (1997) (granting federal agencies deference regarding the interpretation of their
own regulations).
220. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
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federal common-law rules, for 'Congress acts .. . against the background of the
total corpus juris of the states.', 2 2 1
In some cases, courts should adopt a rule from an analogous federal statute
because federal statutory law contains a closer analogue than state law. That
was the case in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in which the
federal statute at issue did not specify a statute of limitations, so the Court's
task was to borrow one from another source of law. 2 The Court's default
presumption was to use state law. But state law contained no cause of action
similar to the unusual labor relations suit at issue. As a result, the Court
borrowed the statute of limitations from analogous federal law. It explained
that where "state statutes of limitations [are] unsatisfactory vehicles for the
enforcement of federal law . . . it may be inappropriate to conclude that
Congress would choose to adopt [such] state rules."2  Rather, it may be
appropriate to adopt a federal rule "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the
federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a
significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking."2 " DelCostello
is a relatively soft precedent. It does not call for the displacement of relevant
state law, but rather for the adoption of more relevant analogous federal law
over less relevant analogous state law. In most administrative law cases, there
will be relevant state and federal law on point, so DelCostello will have no force.
But the use of analogous federal statutes does not end with DelCostello.
Another case, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., suggests that courts should use
the policies embedded in analogous federal statutes to preempt and displace
relevant state law.225 In Boyle, the father of a Marine helicopter pilot who was
killed in a crash brought a tort suit for defective design and repair against the
manufacturer of the helicopter. The Court held that the federal interest in
setting the terms of the military's contracts with its manufacturers preempted
the operation of state law, and that the appropriate choice of substantive law
was federal, not state law. The Court cited the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
as an analogous statute creating a federal policy that the government should
not be liable for "[a]ny claim .. .based upon the exercise or performance or the
221. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
222. 462 U.S. 151, 169-72 (1983).
223. Id. at 161.
224. Id. at 172.
225. 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988).
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failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty,",,, 6 and that "the
selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our
Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of this
provision.""' The Court concluded that "'second-guessing' of these judgments
. .. through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect
sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption," because "[t]he financial burden
of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through,
substantially if not totally, to the United States itself."" Thus, state tort law
"present[ed] a 'significant conflict' with federal policy and must be
displaced.""'
Boyle stands for a muscular use of analogous federal law to shove aside state
law. However, we should be cautious in extending Boyle, as military cases often
present distinctive concerns and stretch the limits of available doctrine.23o That
said, in certain cases, state law might create sufficiently significant conflicts
with federal policies embodied in analogous federal statutes, such as the APA,
to warrant displacement of state law.
The primary federal policy expressed in the APA is that government action
is generally subject to judicial review to ensure that it accords with law. Federal
law contains a "strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of
administrative action."23 "From the beginning 'our cases have established that
judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut
off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress."'" This principle dates back to Marbury v. Madison,"' written when
what is now called administrative law took the form of actions for writs of
mandamus. Later, Chief Justice Marshall "laid the foundation for the modern
presumption of judicial review"2 34 when he wrote that "[i]t would excite some
226. Id. at 511 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 511-12.
229. Id. at 512.
230. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 686 (1987) (holding that a former
serviceman who had been the involuntary subject of an Army LSD experiment was barred
from bringing a Bivens action due to special factors relating to the military); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not allow
military servicemen to sue the United States for tort claims for injuries arising in the course
of military service, despite the absence of any statutory language to that effect).
231. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
232. Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)).
233. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
234. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670.
1323
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
surprise if, in a government of laws and of principle . . . a ministerial officer
might, at his discretion, issue this powerful process ... leaving to that debtor
no remedy, no appeal to the laws of his country.""s The presumption of
judicial review has been "reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review." ,, 6
Boyle suggests that if state law presents a significant conflict with the APA's
policy of accountability, it should be displaced in favor of federal common law
built on the APA. An extreme and clear case would arise if state law applied a
presumption of unreviewability to all agency actions. A closer case would be
where state law has a presumption of reviewability but is so deferential to state
agencies that, in practice, reviewability does not mean so much -as with states,
such as Massachusetts, that follow the older, highly deferential approach to
review of agency action.137
3. Frustration of the Federal Scheme
The third Kimbell Foods exception to the presumption in favor of state law
applies where the "application of the particular state law in question would
frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs."" This exception parallels
the "analogous statute" exception discussed above, but rather than applying
principles from another statute, it seeks to safeguard the goals of the particular
federal program or activity at hand.239
The frustration exception is often used to protect the proprietary interests
of the United States. It has been applied to block state law from determining
title in property created by a procurement contract of the War Department240
and from retroactively abrogating the terms of a written agreement for land
235. United States v. Nourse, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 8, 28-29 (1835).
236. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140.
237. See, e.g., ASIMow &LEVIN, supra note 70, at 598.
238. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., Soo U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (quoting United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)) (internal punctuation marks omitted).
239. It is also related to the uniformity exception; in fact, the uniformity exception is arguably an
especially important subset of the frustration exception. Both are focused on protecting the
statutory regime in question. The frustration exception says that whenever state law would
frustrate a statutory regime, it should be displaced, while the uniformity exception says that
whenever state law would frustrate a federal regime specifically by creating a problematic
lack of uniformity, it should be displaced.
240. See United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182 (1944), abrogated by United
States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
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made by the United States.' In United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., the
Court explained that "in a setting in which the rights of the United States are at
issue in a contract to which it is a party and 'the issue's outcome bears some
relationship to a federal program, no rule may be applied which would not be
wholly in accord with that program."'" Louisiana law was an impermissible
choice because it was "plainly not in accord with the federal program
implemented by the 1937 and 1939 land acquisitions. "3 The Court also noted
the looming presence of the Supremacy Clause, such that "[t]he choice of law
merges with the constitutional demands of controlling federal legislation."'
Frustration of a federal scheme could be the basis for using federal
administrative law in cooperative federalism regimes. For example, if the use of
state law would frustrate the environmental goals of the Clean Air Act, federal
law should govern. The analysis here will be context specific, with the broader
admonition that cooperative federalism regimes invite variation in
implementation in a way that unified federal regimes do not, so that what
might be frustration in a unified federal regime might be par for the course in
the cooperative federalism context.
CONCLUSION
This Note has posed the difficult question of what law should apply when
state agencies are alleged to have violated cooperative federalism statutes.
Though the courts have largely ignored the question and reflexively applied the
law with which they are most familiar, federal common law has already
explained what law should apply when federal law is silent. The answer is that
state law should apply unless doing so creates a significant conflict with federal
policy. We have shown that, though this answer comes from the context of
private law, it is also compelling, on both doctrinal and normative grounds, in
the context of cooperative federalism.
The strength of the Kimbell Foods framework is that it allows for some
measure of predictability while at the same time not oversimplifying the issues
at stake. Of course, extending Kimbell Foods to the new domain of cooperative
federalism raises new issues. One of the most important tasks for courts and
commentators is to organize our understanding of cooperative federalism
statutes and administrative law doctrines to give meaningful guidance to
241. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 58o, 595 (1973).
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agencies. For example, grouping cooperative federalism programs into general
categories based on their level of "cooperativeness" could help state agencies
predict whether their actions will be evaluated under principles of state or
federal administrative law.
The argument in favor of state law will be strongest where federal law
delegates substantial responsibility to state authorities and calls for
implementation through the passage of state laws. It will be weakest when it
calls for state agencies to directly apply federal law and delegates minimal
responsibility to them. Probative factors may include whether the cooperative
federalism regime grants state agencies substantial policy or enforcement
discretion; whether state programs predated federal programs and federal
legislation evinces a desire to layer on top of rather than displace those
programs; and whether funding is largely or primarily a state or local concern.
In addition, cooperative federalism laws that give state and federal agencies
overlapping implementation responsibilities invite less state autonomy than
laws that clearly delegate sole responsibility for implementation to the states.
Other aspects of cooperative federalism laws may affect the deference due
state law in more complicated ways.' For example, some cooperative
federalism laws create federal floors or ceilings, often enforced by the threat of
federal backstop authority -does this make a program more or less demanding
of uniformity?47 Statutes also delegate to a broad range of "state" actors, some
of whom may merit more deference than others."' Some even delegate
245. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 578-79 ("[T]he extent of the overlap between state and federal
implementation responsibility already ha[s] created numerous areas of interpretive
uncertainty. Even as the states have begun to implement the [Affordable Care Act], they are
not sure how much uniformity HHS will require . . . ."); see also William W. Buzbee,
Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1547, 1605 (2007) (explaining how overlapping implementation responsibilities may
influence preemption analysis).
246. Gluck, supra note 4, at 550 ("This literature also has viewed 'cooperative federalism' as an
undifferentiated category, when in fact there is much diversity within this category with
respect to how exactly these schemes are designed.").
247. See Buzbee, supra note 245, at 1555 (discussing federal floors and ceilings and arguing that
federal preemption applies more naturally to floors than to ceilings); see also Gluck, supra
note 4, at 544 (suggesting these regulatory choices could influence statutory interpretation
doctrine).
248. Gluck, supra note 4, at 598 ("There may be arguments justifying different preferences for
state autonomy in federal statutory implementation depending on what the 'state' is in any
given context."); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use ofFederal Law To
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1201 (1999)
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responsibility to local agencies, such as school districts, or independent
actors.m9
Courts and commentators can also develop this area of law by thinking
about the differences between various doctrines of administrative law. We have
argued that the use of state principles regarding agency interpretations of
statutes is more likely to create serious problems with uniformity than the use
of state principles regarding the standard of review that governs agency action.
But a full consideration of this complex issue is not possible in this Note. We
hope that this is just the beginning of a conversation on these and other
administrative law doctrines.
While each statute and doctrine presents distinct concerns, Kimbell Foods
provides a framework to analyze these issues in an orderly manner that is
consistent with the ethos of cooperative federalism. Courts can determine what
law to apply by asking whether application of state law would create a
significant conflict with federal policies. While this question may not be as
simple as it seems, when both state and federal courts start approaching this
issue through the same question, we should expect greater consistency in the
law, greater respect for state and federal policy needs, and perhaps even a more
fruitful dialogue between state and federal courts on administrative law.2"o
249. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 606-07 (discussing Chevron's relationship to other nonfederal
implementers).
250. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977) (discussing the benefits of creative dialogue between state
and federal courts).
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